ABSTRACT: This article outlines recent trends in the scholarship on the Royal Navy in the years preceding the outbreak of the First World War.
synthesis, which remains the key resource on the topic for the majority of non-specialists, established the narrative of the inspirational First Sea Lord Admiral Sir John 'Jackie' Fisher presiding over a period of 'revolutionary' and transformational change in naval affairs before the outbreak of War. Seeking to shake the service free of its alleged Victorian stupor and to prepare it to wage modern industrial war against Germany, Fisher both introduced radical new types of warship -epitomized by HMS Dreadnought -and also concentrated the navy's major assets in its future battleground, the North Sea. The consequence of Fisher's efforts was that, when war came in 1914, the German battle fleet was directly faced by a much stronger and more formidable opponent in the form of the British Grand Fleet, a concentrated and powerful force of dreadnought battleships that blocked German access to the high seas. As a result, Germany's battleships remained bottled up in harbour for much of the war before ultimately being interned in 1918 and scuttled in Scapa Flow in 1919. Beginning in the late 1970s, however, a group of revisionist scholars began to challenge some of the central elements of Marder's thesis.
These revisionist historians agree with Marder that Fisher transformed the Royal Navy, but they contest the nature, origins and aims of the changes that took place. Rejecting Marder's argument that Fisher's 3 inspiration was the need to meet the German threat, they contend instead that Fisher projected a far more ambitious, financially motivated programme of technologically driven reforms aimed at meeting the global threats posed by France and Russia. To this end, they claim that he wanted to enact fundamental changes to the force structure and fighting methods of the Royal Navy; abandon battleship construction altogether, defend mainland Britain with a 'swarm' of small torpedo craft, and protect the Empire with a new model of capital ship, the battle cruiser. Thus, instead of Marder's battleshipcentred 'Dreadnought revolution', they propounded 'Fisher's naval revolution', portraying the First Sea Lord as a 'radical naval thinker' whose hidden agenda was fundamentally to alter the manner in which the Royal Navy projected power and prosecuted future warfare.
The revisionist analysis has been instrumental in causing the comfortable orthodoxy that Marder established to be questioned at several levels, but that does not mean it has been accepted itself. On the contrary, it is now confronted with a 'post-revisionist' perspective that challenges it at almost every level. In contrast both to Marder and his revisionist critics, these scholars see the changes that took place before 1914 as much more evolutionary than revolutionary. For these scholars the battle fleet, composed of large armoured warships, 4 remains central to explanations of the defence of the British Isles.
Similarly, for these scholars, the new technologies on which revisionists lay such stress -including submarines, wireless and fire control systems -did not invalidate the existing defence paradigm; rather they augmented it with new capabilities and slowly caused it to adapt in appropriate ways.
Why this difference? In part this reflects a stress on actions rather than intentions. For all its supporters' talk of its great analytical breadth, the revisionist interpretation actually focuses rather narrowly upon the person of Jackie Fisher and his supposedly radical reformist agenda. Revisionists paint a picture of Fisher as a frustrated maverick, straining against the institutional conservatism of the Royal Navy with a mixed degree of success. Although he achieved much, he could never persuade his more conservative colleagues to adopt his more radical schemes, with the result that most of them never got off the drawing board -if they ever existed at all. This being so, for revisionists, the goal of their work -and also their principal challenge -is to outline the full extent of Fisher's radical vision and then explain why his great transformative plans never came to pass, and why we Taken together, the six articles amassed here show a range of areas in which the 'naval revolution' argument of the revisionist school is under 13 scrutiny and offer an insight into some of the objections that have been raised to this concept. This is essential if we are to move away from the fruitless debate about Marder's legacy and to start to move the naval history of the pre-First World War era forward again. This is now a lively, contested area full of new possibilities. To develop these fully, some of the older and now discredited ideas of a former era need to be torn down and some of the more speculative concepts of recent years need proper scrutiny. This special edition is a step in that direction.
